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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE MEETS THE DELID
SANDS FLOWER-LOVING FLY

John Copeland Nagle*
God in His wisdom made the fly
And then forgot to tell us why.
- Ogden Nashl

The protagonist in our story has six legs, is one inch long, and
dies two weeks after it emerges from the ground. To the untrained
eye, the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly looks like, well, a big fly.
Entomologists know better. This particular fly can hover like a
hummingbird as it uses its long tubular nose to extract nectar from
flowers. It can only live in particular fine soils - the Delhi sands
- that appear in patches over a forty square mile stretch from
Colton to Ontario, California. Today only a few hundred Delhi
Sands Flower-Loving Flies survive in less than a dozen such patches
located in an eight-mile radius split by I-10 and the Southern Pacific
railroad tracks. Therein lies the Fly's claim to fame. Of the 80,000
known species of flies, the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly is the
only one to be listed as endangered under the Endangered Species
Act,2 and it is the only fly to divide the D.C. Circuit three ways
concerning the meaning of the Commerce Clause.3
* VISiting Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School, 1998-1999; Associate Professor,
Seton Hall University School of Law Gohn.c.nagle.8@nd.edu). B.A. 1982, Indiana, Bloom
ington; J.D. 1986, University of Michigan. - Ed. This essay benefitted immeasurably from
faculty presentations at the University of Minnesota Law School and the Notre Dame Law
School. I am also grateful for the comments and thoughts shared by Howard Erichson, Bill
Funk, Abner Greene, Edward Hartnett, Stephen Johnson, Bill Kelley, Lisa Nagle, and J.B.
Ruhl,· and for the rese.arch assistance of Laura Amos and Paul Vance. I am indebted to my
father, Jim Nagle, for his memory of Ogden Nash's poems.
1. OGDEN NAsH, The Fly, in GooD INTENTIONS 173 (1942).
2. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered
Status for the Delhi Sands Flower-loving Fly, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,881 (1993) (to be codified at 30
C.F.R. pt. 17:11 (n)) [hereinafter FWS Fly Listing Decision]. To see a nice color picture of
the Fly, see Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly (Diptera Apioceridae) <http://
shanana.berkeley.edu/essig/endins/raphiomi.htm>. For more detail about the life of the Fly,
see FWS Fly Listing Decision, supra, at 49,881-82; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, TECHNI
CAIJAGENCY DRAFI' RECOVERY PLAN FOR TiiE DELHI SANDS FLOWER-LoVING FLY
(Rhaphiomidas tenninatus abdonimalis) 1-2 (1996) [hereinafter FLY DRAFI' REcoVERY
PLAN]; Kenneth J. Kingsley, Behavior of the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly (Diptera:
Mydidae), A Little-Known Endangered Species, 89 ANNALS ENTOMOL. SoCY. AM. 883, 88391 (1996).
3. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998).
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The Fly ended up in court because people wanted to use its
habitat for other purposes. That anyone would want this land,
home to a notorious hazardous waste site as well as the interstate
and the railroad,4 is rather surprising. But the Fly earned the status
of endangered under the Endangered Species Act (BSA) on the
day before San Bernardino County planned to begin construction
of a state-of-the-art hospital in the middle of the Fly's dwindling
habitat.5 The BSA prohibits the "tak[ing]" of any endangered spe
cies,6 which has been interpreted to include "significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures" a
member of the species.7 The county responded to the ESA's tak
ings provision by modifying its building plans, creating an eight-acre
Fly refuge, and establishing a corridor of land connecting one Fly
colony to another. The county made further concessions in ex
change for permission to build an electrical power station for the
hospital. But when the county learned that the Fly stood in the way
of its plans to redesign an intersection used by emergency vehicles
traveling to the hospital, the county filed suit challenging the appli
cation of the ESA to the habitat of the Fly. The county was joined
by the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) and several
other trade groups that wished to build in the Fly's habitat, and by
several municipalities that complained about the Fly's interference
with their financial stability, land use planning, and projects of their
own.8
Disdaining more conventional weapons for fighting flies, the
county turned to the Supreme Court's decision in

United States v.
Lopez.9 Lopez was the first case since the New Deal to hold that a
4. See William Booth, Developers Wish. Rare Fly Would Buzz Off: Flower-Loving Insect
Becomes Symbol for Opponents of Endangered Species Act, WASH. PosT, Apr. 4, 1997, at Al
(noting that "the fly today shares its shrinking home with a cement quarry, a petroleum tank
farm, a sewage plant and a Superfund site known ominously as the Stringfellow Acid Pits,"
and quoting a local official who characterized the site as "a bunch of dirt and weeds").
5. See FWS Fly Listing Decision, supra note 2; see also National Assn. ofHome Builders,
130 F.3d at 1060 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (noting that the FWS listed the Fly on the day
before construction of the hospital was scheduled to begin).
6. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1994).
7. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1997); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (upholding the FISh & Wildlife Service regulation defining
"take" to include certain habitat destruction).
8. For the saga of the Fly and its competitors, see National Assn. ofHome Builders, 130
F.3d at 1043-45; 130 F.3d at 1060 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); Endangered Species Act
Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Drinking Water, Fisheries, and Wildlife
of the Senate Comm. on Envt. and Public Works, 104th Cong. 804-06 (1995) (statement of
Randy Scott, Planning Manager, San Bernardino County); Booth, supra note 4, at Al; David
G. Savage, Buzz Over a Fly Presents Challenge to Species Act, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1998, at
Al.
9. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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federal statute exceeded congressional power under the Commerce
Clause. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199010 suffered that
fate because it fell outside all three categories of activities within
the scope of the Commerce Clause: (1) the use of the channels of
interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate com
merce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) activi
ties that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.11 The
Act lacked a jurisdictional statement that would have limited its ap
plication to cases involving interstate commerce, Congress did not
make any :findings about the impact that guns near schools have on
interstate commerce, and the Court itself could not see any such
connection even through the lens of the deferential rational basis
test. The Court's approach precluded both the narrower formula
tion of Justice Thomas, who criticized the extension of congres
sional power to activities that merely substantially affect interstate
commerce,12 and the broader formulation of Justice Breyer, who
believed that guns near schools did substantially affect interstate
commerce.13 The Court responded to Justice Breyer by insisting
that any Commerce Clause test must leave some activities beyond
the scope of federal authority; put negatively, a test that allows
Congress to regulate anything in the name of interstate commerce is
contrary to the limited, enumerated powers given Congress by the
Constitution.14
Whether Lopez marks a dramatic shift in Commerce Clause ju
risprudence or is instead destined to be a "but see" citation remains
to be seen. The Court itself has already declined the invitation to
invalidate statutes in several cases involving connections to inter
state commerce that seemed even more tenuous than that in
Lopez.15 The lower federal courts have produced numerous split
opinions regarding the consistency of a diverse group of federal
10. 18 u.s.c. § 922{q) {1990).
11. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
12. See 514 U.S. at 584-602 {Thomas, J., concurring).
13. See 514 U.S. at 618-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
14. See 514 U.S. at 564 (protesting that Justice Breyer's dissent was "unable to identify
any activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not"); 514 U.S. at 567 (stating that
the Court was unwilling to conclude that "the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not
presuppose something not enumerated").
15. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 {1995) (upholding the application
of RICO to a defendant who invested illegal drug proceeds in a gold mine); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 {1995) (sustaining the application of the Federal Arbi
tration Act to a termite protection contract signed by an Alabama homeowner); see generally
Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 731-38 (1995) {describing these
cases and other recent Co=erce Clause cases in which the Court denied certiorari).
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statutes with the Commerce Clause.16 Federal environmental legis
lation has survived similar broad challenges so far, but some judges
have been willing to hold that particular applications of the Com
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) and of the wetlands provisions of the Clean Water
Act violate the Commerce Clause.17
San Bernardino and its friends attacked the application of the
BSA to the protection of the Fly against this backdrop. They lost,
first in the district court and then in a

2-1

decision in the D.C. Cir

cuit.18 But unlike the district court and earlier courts to decide
Commerce Clause challenges to the BSA, the three judges on the
D.C. Circuit offered strikingly diverse explanations for why the
BSA could - or could not - constitutionally require the protec
tion of the Fly's habitat. Judge Wald determined that the ESA's
takings provision fit within the first

Lopez

category - the use of

the channels of interstate commerce - because Congress can con16. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir.
1997) (2-1 decision upholding the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Bailey,
115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997) (2-1 decision upholding the Child Support Recovery Act), cert
denied, 118 S. Ct. 866 (1997); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995) (2-1 deci
sion upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act); United States v. Bishop, 66
F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995) (2-1 decision upholding the federal carjacking statute). Such deci
sions caused the opponents of the ESA's application to the Fly to declare that "[t]he judges
of the lower federal courts . . . haven't the foggiest idea what [the Supreme] Court meant
when it decided Lopez." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, National Assn. of Home Build
ers v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
17. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) (invalidating a regulation
extending the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act to waters whose degradation "could" affect
interstate commerce); United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (Hand,
J.) (holding that CERCLA cannot be applied to an inactive hazardous waste site with no
ongoing connection to interstate commerce), revd., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997); see also
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1993) (Manion, J., concurring in the
judgment) (concluding that the Commerce Clause prohibits the Clean Water Act from reach
ing isolated wetlands). Additionally, several commentators have expressed doubts about the
consistency of the BSA and other environmental statutes with the Commerce Clause post
Lopez. See J. Blanding Holman IV, After United States v. Lopez: Can the Clean Water Act
and the Endangered Species Act Survive Commerce Clause Attack?, 15 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 139,
141 (1995) (concluding that the ESA's takings provision "is at risk" until Congress acts to
clarify the economic value of biodiversity); Stephen M. Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A
Misstep, but Hardly Epochal for Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 33,
78-79 (1996) (observing that "[f]ederal regulation of endangered species that are not articles
of commerce may be the most difficult environmental regulation to justify after Lopez");
David A. Linehan, Note, Endangered Regulation: Why the Commerce Clause May No
Longer Be Suitable Habitat for Endangered Species and Wetlands Regulation, 2 TEx. REv. L.
& PoL. 365, 367 (1998) (concluding that the ESA's takings prohibition is "no longer defensi
ble as [a] proper exercise[ ] of congressional power under the Commerce Clause"); see also
Suzanna Sherry, The Barking Dog, 46 CASE W . REs. L. REv. 877, 881 (1996) (describing the
destruction of endangered species habitat by private landowners as "an activity only specula
tively related to interstate commerce").
18. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 949 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1996),
affd., 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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trol the transportation of endangered species and because Congress
can keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral
uses.19 She also found that the takings provision fit within the third
category - activities that substantially affect interstate commerce
- because the statute protects biodiversity for current and future
interstate commerce and because the statute avoids destructive in
terstate competition with respect to endangered species.20 Judge
Henderson's concurrence agreed only that the statute satisfied the
third category, albeit for different reasons than those articulated by
Judge Wald.21 Judge Sentelle would have held that the ESA cannot
be constitutionally applied to the habitat of the Fly because the case
fell outside all of the Lopez categories.22
The explanation for their different explanations, in turn, is quite
simple: each of the D.C. Circuit judges focused on a different ques
tion. Judge Wald asked whether there was a sufficient relationship
between

endangered species

and interstate commerce, concluding

that there was. Judge Henderson asked whether there was a rela
tionship between the

hospital and

interstate commerce, again con

cluding that there was. By contrast, Judge Sentelle asked whether
there was a relationship between the
concluding that there was not.23

Fly

and interstate commerce,

This article explores who asked the right question. Whether the
Commerce Clause empowers Congress to protect the habitat of the
Fly depends upon the kind of connection to interstate commerce
that is required. As discussed in Part

I,

the ESA constitutionally

protects the habitat of the Fly if the appropriate inquiry examines
the relationship between endangered species and interstate com
merce, or the relationship between the hospital (or the housing de
velopments sought by the NAHB) and interstate commerce. If, on
the other hand, there must be a relationship between the Fly and
19. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046-49 (Wald, J.).
20. See 130 F.3d at 1049-57 (Wald, J.).
21. See 130 F.3d at 1057-60 (Henderson, J., concurring).
22. See 130 F.3d at 1060-67 {Sentelle, J., dissenting).
23. This is somewhat of an exaggeration insofar as Judge Wald did note the impact of the
hospital on interstate co=erce, see 130 F.3d at 1048, while Judge Henderson relied upon the
narrower view of the impact of endangered species on interstate co=erce as an alternative
basis for her concurrence see 130 F.3d at 1058-59. I describe their focus as being on endan
gered species or the hospital, respectively, because Judge Wald spent much more time dis
cussing endangered species than the hospital, whereas Judge Henderson's opinion gave the
two topics about equal weight despite the nearly exclusive focus on endangered species
adopted by the other courts and co=entators to consider the question. See, e.g., Building
Indus. Assn. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 906-08 (D.D.C. 1997) (explaining the relationship
between endangered species and interstate co=erce); Johnson, supra note 17, at 77-82 {fo·
cusing on the relationship betwe�n endangered species and interstate co=erce).
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interstate commerce, the lack of such a relationship dooms the ap
plication of the BSA to the habitat of the Fly. The same result
would obtain for the hundreds of other species that are not in
volved in, and exert no influence on, interstate commerce.
That these questions are raised in the context of the protection
of an endangered species should not be surprising. Unlike the ac
tivities at issue in most of the Court's Commerce Clause cases,
there is no commerce in the Fly: no one buys it, sells it, or uses it to
travel interstate. It is, quite simply, noncommercial. Yet Congress
places a tremendous value on the protection of all endangered spe
cies,24 so Congress wants to prevent the Fly from disappearing from
the earth, whether or not the Fly ever plays a noticeable role in
human affairs. The Commerce Clause dilemma is whether Con
gress has the power to protect something that is very rare, very val
uable, and seemingly entirely uninvolved with commerce between
the states. It is a dilemma that transcends the preservation of en
dangered species and implicates federal efforts to protect historic
buildings, scenic landscapes, works of art, and other valuable
resources.
It is also a dilemma that has received little attention. The many
pages that have been written regarding the proper understanding of
the Commerce Clause have largely addressed the meaning of "com
merce," the appropriate judicial role with respect to the clause, and
similarly abstract questions. Those are not my concerns here. In
deed, while I presuppose the existence of some judicial role in this
context, I also am willing to assume that both Lopez and New Deal
cases such as Wickard v. Filburn25 are correct. But however one
views the extent of the relationship to interstate commerce de
manded by the Commerce Clause, the question of exactly what
must be related to interstate commerce remains. That is what di
vided the court in the Fly case, and it is what this article considers.
Part II examines three facets of that issue. First, section II.A
considers the aggregation principle, made famous by Wickard, that
allows Congress to consider the cumulative effect of similar activi
ties on interstate commerce. What Wickard does not answer is the
level of generality that Congress is permitted to use when aggregat-

24. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.153, 174, 184 (1978) {observing that Con
gress wanted to afford endangered species "the highest of priorities" and to "reverse the
trend toward extinction, whatever the cost").
25. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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ing "similar" activities.26 The question raised by the Fly case is
whether a statute based on a broader aggregation can constitution
ally be applied to a narrow category that lacks the required substan
tial relationship to interstate commerce. If Congress can treat all
endangered species alike and thereby regulate every species despite
its lack of any connection to interstate commerce, then the scope of
the Commerce Clause will be truly unlimited. I doubt Congress can
do so. Second, section II.B asks whether Congress can rely upon
the

potential

effect that an activity will have on interstate com

merce. There are powerful reasons why Congress would want to do
so: the value of many endangered species, for example, may not be
known for years to come. Yet this seems problematic because it,
too, could allow Congress to regulate anything because anything
might affect interstate commerce someday. I suggest a middle
ground that would empower Congress to act only if it can point to
evidence providing a reasonable basis for believing that a particular
resource will contribute to interstate commerce one day. Third,
section II.C considers which activity must be related to interstate
commerce. The choice of activities is important precisely because it
often determines whether there is a sufficient relationship to inter
state commerce to trigger the Commerce Clause. The problem is
deciding whether the congressional means must be related to inter
state commerce, or the congressional ends, or either, or both. The
means of the ESA - in this case, prohibiting any building in the
Fly's habitat - have an obvious effect on interstate commerce,
while the effect of the ends - preserving endangered species - is
harder to prove. But either one should suffice. That still leaves
some activities - imagine children walking barefoot through the
Fly's habitat - beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause, which
preserves the Lopez insistence that a proper Commerce Clause test
distinguish between those activities that Congress can regulate and
those it cannot.
I.

THE RIGHT ANSWERS

Judge Wald, Judge Henderson, and Judge Sentelle answered the
Commerce Clause question raised by the application of the ESA to
the Fly's habitat by focusing upon endangered species, the hospital,
and the Fly, respectively. Before considering which inquiry is cor
rect, 'it is helpful to see where each path leads. The three different
26. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 226 (3d ed. 1996) (suggesting
that neither Wickard nor Lopez say how one determines what activities are sufficiently simi·
Iar to be aggregated).
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choices raise a number of questions about the necessary relation
ship to interstate commerce. These questions produce conflicting
answers, so the fate of the ESA's protection of the Fly's habitat
depends on which is the right question to ask.
The Relationship Between the Fly and Interstate Commerce

A.
1.

The Actual Relationship Between the Fly and Interstate
Commerce

Suffice it to say that the Fly does not offer a noticeable contribu
tion to the economy of San Bernardino County or anywhere else.
The Fly does not possess any known medical value. Tourists do not
flock to see it. People do not eat it. Scientists have searched in vain
for any contributions that the Fly makes to human life. It is not the
subject of the popular imagination or a key performer in the popu
lar culture.21
Nonetheless, the government bravely suggested that the Fly was
active in interstate commerce, and the district court agreed. That
relationship was revealed by (1) the exhibition of the Fly in at least
three museums located outside of California, (2) at least two in
stances where people outside of California purchased a Fly via an
insect sales catalog, (3) people who traveled to California to ob
serve and study the Fly, and (4) articles about the Fly in scientific
joumals.28 These are relationships to interstate commerce, but it is
hard to maintain that they are the substantial relationships needed
to invoke the Commerce Clause. Nor would other hypothetical
but easily manufactured - relationships suffice. The fact that I
have plane tickets in hand to travel to California to visit the Fly
may get me standing to object to any action that would harm the
27. Of course all flies suffer from this last indignity, not just the Delhi Sands Flower
Loving Fly. See FLY DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 2, at 35 (proposing a public rela
tions campaign "aimed at dispelling the public's automatic association with, and disdain for,
house flies"). For some of the rare instances in which flies have gained some popular atten
tion, see THE FLY (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1986) (starring Geena Davis and Jeff
Goldblum); THE FLY (Twentieth Century Fox Ftlm Corp. 1958) (starring Vmcent Price); and
my personal favorite, MIKE McCUNToCK, A FLY WENT BY (1958).
28. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 949 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1996),
affd., 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Brief for the Appellees at 32-33, National Assn. of
Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (No. 96-5354) [hereinafter U.S.
Brief]; accord FWS Fly Listing Decision, supra note 2, at 49,885 (noting that "[a]lthough flies
in general are not especially popular with collectors, Rhaphiomidas flies [which includes the
Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly] are prized because of their unusual size, coloration, and
rarity"); Booth, supra note 4, at Al (quoting the scientist who petitioned for the listing of the
Fly under the ESA as saying, "If you see a live one flying around you don't soon forget it.
It's spectacular."); Endangered! Delhi Sands Fly <http:l/www.amnh.org/Exhibition/Expedi
tion/Endangered/fl.y/fl.y.html> (feature on the Fly published at the American Museum of Nat
ural History's web site).
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Fly,29 but it will not trigger the power of Congress to invoke the
Commerce Clause. Likewise, the availability of souvenirs depicting
a seemingly obscure endangered species should not tie the species
to interstate commerce because the ability to market products fea
turing a species may actually be enhanced if the species becomes
extinct. Perhaps the most telling criticism of the adequacy of these
relationships is that Judge Wald abandoned any contention that the
Fly itself actually affects interstate commerce, despite her various
other theories supporting the reach of the ESA's takings provision
in this case.
It is unlikely, therefore, that the Fly can be shown to have an

actual, substantial relationship with interstate commerce. But even
if one determined that the evidence that the district court recited
was sufficient, that would not resolve the constitutionality of the
ESA in other cases. Other endangered species are harder to con
nect to interstate commerce than the Fly. The primary habitat of
the recently listed Peck's cave amphipod is "a zone of permanent
darkness"

in a single

underground aquifer

in Texas.30

The

Cowhead Lake tui chub is a three inch minnow with no known
commercial or recreational value that is found only in one three
mile stretch of water in rural northern California.31 The Deseret
milk-vetch is even more reclusive, thought to be extinct for seventy
two years prior to its rediscovery on one 300-acre site in central
Utah.32 There are many such species that survive only in one state,
that were long thought to be extinct, that are quite similar in func
tion to other species, or for which there is no discernible commerce
- and there are some species that possess all of those characteris
tics. Indeed, the litigation over the Fly itself has already prompted
landowners to claim that the federal government lacks the authority
to list the Illinois cave amphipod because that species does not af29. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992); 504 U.S. at 579
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
30. See Endangered and Threatened \Vildlife and Plants; Final Rule to List Three
Aquatic Invertebrates in Comal and Hays Counties, TX, as Endangered, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,295,
66,296 (1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
31. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Endangered Status
for the Cowhead Lake Thi Chub, 63 Fed. Reg. 15,152, 15,152-53 (1998) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17). Note that the proposal to list the species has not yet become final.
32. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Threatened Status for
the Plant Astragalus Desereticus (Deseret milk-vetch), 63 Fed. Reg. 4,207 (1998) (to be codi
fied at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (hereinafter FWS Deseret Milk-Vetch Listing]. Note that the plant
appears to be tasty to cattle, see id. at 4,209, and that plants do not receive the protection of
the ESA's takings prohibition, although plants on federal land cannot be removed, mali
ciously damaged, or destroyed, see 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1994).
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feet interstate commerce.33 So even if one would strain to identify a
connection between the Fly and interstate commerce, someday an
other case involving an even more obscure species would raise the
same questions.

2. The Potential Relationship Between the Fly and Interstate
Commerce
Judge Wald speculated that "it is not beyond the realm of possi
bility" that the Fly could contribute to the pollination of America's
farms.34 Likewise, one would expect that scientists could surely
learn something from the Fly, especially since the Delhi Sands
Flower-Loving Fly is the last subspecies of its species, and one of
only a few left in its zoological family.35 The decision to protect the
Fly also recognizes the importance of the continuing availability of
a wide variety of species to interstate commerce,36 a variety that
demands a large number of species but no one species in particular.
Judge Wald wrote that "diminishing a natural resource that could
otherwise be used for present and future commercial purposes" ties
all species, including the Fly, to interstate commerce.37 More sar
castically, Judge Sentelle's concern about the consequences that
would follow if a Fly splattered on the windshield of a car would
become even greater if the car was traveling across state lines.38
Each of t�ese arguments relies upon the effect that the Fly

could

have on interstate commerce. There is no evidence to support any
of the claims at this time. Thus Judge Henderson objected that "it
is possible that no endangered species will ever realize an uncertain
potential medical or economic value."39 But it would be presump
tuous to contend that we know everything there is to know about
the Fly and its relationship to natural processes or human activities.
Indeed, the unknown benefits of a species are routinely cited as a
reason for protecting the species, even when we have not identified
33. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Fmal Rule to List the Illinois
Cave Amphipod as Endangered, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,900, 46,902 (1998) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17)
34. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
35. See FWS Fly Listing Decision, supra note 2, at 49,881.
36. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052-53 (Wald, J.).
37. National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1053 (Wald, J.) ("A species whose
worth is still unmeasured has what economists call an 'option value' - the value of the
possibility that a future discovery will make useful a species that is currently thought of as
useless.") (citing Bryan Norton, Commodity, Amenity, and Morality: The Limits of Quantifi
cation in Valuing Biodiversity, in BIODIVERSITY 200, 202 (Edward 0. Wilson ed., 1988)).
38. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1061 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
39. National Assn. ofHome Builders, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring).
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those benefits to date.40 Thus it is possible that the Fly could yield
valuable services to human society once we manage to discover
them. Meanwhile, our inability to know whether the Fly can be
valuable or not makes us unable to know whether the Fly will sub
stantially affect interstate commerce or not.
B.

The Relationship Between Endangered Species and Interstate
Commerce

1.

The Relationship Between Endangered Species Generally and
Interstate Commerce

There is a substantial relationship between endangered species
writ large and interstate commerce. Congress stated that the ESA
is necessary because "species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of es
thetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific
value to the Nation and its people."41 Consider each of these val
ues. The esthetic and recreational worth of endangered species is
demonstrated by the millions of people who travel to see whales,
bald eagles, grizzly bears, whooping cranes, and other rare animals
throughout the country. Such ecotourism accounts for billions of
dollars annually in the surrounding communities.42 The ecological
value of endangered species refers to the role that animals and
plants play in promoting air and water quality, regulating the cli
mate, removing unwanted pests, creating and protecting soil, con
trolling floods and droughts, pollinating crops, protecting the earth
from ultraviolet rays, and dispersing seeds and nutrients.43 Endan40. See National Assn. ofHome Builders, 130 F.3d at 1053 {Wald, J.); CHARLES C. MANN
& MA.rue L. PLUMMER, NoAH's CH01CE: THE FUTURE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES 121-22
(1995) (observing that "biologists frequently liken the world's biodiversity to a library in
which the vast majority of books have never been read. . . . Reading the books in the species
library once will not be enough . . . . Each generation will profit from reading them over and
over again.").
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1531{a)(3) {1994).
42. See JAMES D. CAUDILL, 1991 ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF NONCONSUMPTIVE WILDLIFE
RELATED RECREATION 6-7 {1997) (Fish & Wiidlife Service report finding that the 76 million
Americans who watched, photographed, and fed birds and other wildlife in 1991 spent $18.1
billion on those activities); U.S. Brief, supra note 28, at 19, 23 & n.12, 26-27 (providing exam
ples of the co=ercial and tourism value of endangered species); see also John Copeland
Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1171, 1209-11 (1998) (citing additional sources).
43. See Endangered Species Act- Bakersfield, California: Hearing Before the Task Force
on Endangered Species of the House Resources Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1995) (tes
timony of Arthur D. Unger, Kem-Kaweah Chapter of the Sierra Club) (noting that wasps
can be used to control certain breeds of files); MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 40, at 123;
NATURE'S SERVICES (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997) (collecting essays written by different
specialists on the value of services provided by marine ecosystems, freshwater ecosystems,
forests, and grasslands with respect to soil, pollination, and pest control); Nagle, supra note
42, at 1211-16 (citing additional sources).
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gered species serve an educational and scientific function by teach
ing us about ourselves and the world in which we live. Historical
benefits come from bald eagles and other species that have a special
place in our national consciousness.44
There are other benefits that Congress did not mention in its
purpose statement for the BSA. Most importantly, endangered
plants and animals may be an important source of drugs and other
medical treatments.45 Several plants are being studied in an effort
to find a cure for AIDS.46 Likewise, the nutritional value of endan
gered species is seen in the nearly. billion dollars that genes from
wild plant species add to agricultural production in the United
States each year.47
Each of these reasons for protecting endangered species is easily
linked to interstate commerce. Other reasons, especially the moral
and religious arguments for the preservation of endangered species,
are less readily tied to interstate commerce.48 Likewise, many en
dangered species are found in more than one state, though why that
serves to justify federal regulation under the Commerce Clause has
never been clear to me.49 But even without the moral arguments or
44. Cf., e.g., Nagle, supra note 42, at 1196 (describing the ESA listing of the California
Red-Legged Frog memorialized by Mark Twain as the Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras
County).
45. See Medicinal Uses of Plants; Protection for Plants Under the Endangered Species Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomm on Envt. and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong. (1993) (discussing the efforts to obtain medicine
from plants); H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973); S. REP. No. 91-526, at 3 (1969), reprinted in
1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 1415; MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 40, at 120-21 ("Bark from the
white willow gave us salicin, an ancient version of aspirin; the Grecian foxglove provided
digoxin, a cardiac medication; bear bile is the origin of ursodiol, a gallstone dissolver; deadly
nightshade led to atropine, an eye dilator and anti-inflammatory; the velvet bean produced
L-dopa, a treatment for Parkinson's disease; and everyone knows the story of penicillin, the
bacteria slayer discovered accidentally in a mold."); EDWARD 0. WILSO N, THE DIVERSITY OF
LIFE 285-86 (1992); Thomas E. Lovejoy, Biodiversity: What ls It?, in BIODIVERSITY II: UN
DERSTANDING AND PROTECTING OUR BIOLOGICAL REsoURCES 7, 9 (Marjorie L. Reaka
Kudla et al. eds., 1997).
46. See Nagle, supra note 42, at 1208 n.140 (citing sources).
47. See Endangered Species Act: Washington DC - Part II: Hearing Before the Task
Force on the Endangered Species Act of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. 190
(1995) (quoting the statement of the National Wtldlife Federation); see also Norman Myers,
Biodiversity's Genetic Library, in NATURE 'S SERVICES, supra note 43, at 256-59 (describing
how wild com, wild rice, and other rare species can provide food to humans).
48. See generally Nagle, supra note 42, at 1216-47 (recounting the moral, ethical, and
religious arguments for protecting endangered species).
49. Both sides in the Fly case contended that the case had ramifications for all endan
gered species that live in only one state, though they never explained why species that live in
more than one state are so plainly within the scope of congressional jurisdiction. A similar
rule exists with respect to federal regulation of wetlands under the Clean Water Act: if a
Inigratory bird crosses state lines to a particular body of water, that trip places the water
within the scope of congressional power. See Elaine Bueschen, Comment, Do Isolated Wet
lands Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce?, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 931, 941-43 {1997). Why
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the movement of the species themselves, the utilitarian values cited
by Congress when it enacted the BSA provide ample grounds for
concluding that the protection of endangered species bears a sub
stantial relation to interstate commerce.

2.

The Relationship Between Each Endangered Species and
Interstate Commerce

The Commerce Clause would plainly be inadequate as a consti
tutional basis for the BSA if each protected species were required
to possess an actual medicinal, nutritional, or other specific value.
The countless benefits provided by endangered species as a class do
not mean that

every

endangered species offers utilitarian benefits.

Most species are of no nutritional value to humans. Efforts to iden
tify plants and animals with medicinal uses have identified far more
useless species than helpful ones. Tourists are far more likely to
visit bald eagles or manatees than fairy shrimp or the Deseret milk
vetch. In short, "biodiversity as a whole has overwhelming utilita
rian value, but most individual species do not."50
Nonetheless, there are two ways to try to tie every endangered
species to interstate commerce: the ecosystem argument and the
biodiversity argument. The ecosystem argument relies upon the
ecological truism that the loss of any individual species affects the
ecosystem of which it is part.51 The argument has several problems.
the fact that a bird or animal crosses state lines of its own volition and without being itself an
object of interstate commerce is sufficient for Commerce Clause purposes remains unex
plained. See Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955, 958 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of cert.) (opining that the assumption that "the self-propelled flight of birds
across state lines creates a sufficient interstate nexus to justify the Corps' assertion of jurisdic
tion over any standing water that could serve as a habitat for migratory birds . . . likely
stretches Congress' Commerce Clause powers beyond the breaking point").
50. MANN & PL UMMER, supra note 40, at 133; accord RONALD DWORKIN , L1FB'S
DOMINION : AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
75 (1993) (arguing that none of the utilitarian arguments for protecting endangered species
"rings true"); HoLMES RoLSTON III, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHJcs: DUTIES TO AND VALUES IN
TiiE NATURAL WORLD 130 (1988) (admitting that "[a] substantial number of endangered
species have no resource value"); Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species,
and What Does That Say About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them
Constitute "Takings"?, 80 lowA L. Rev. 297, 298 (1995) (acknowledging that "endangered
species are, for the most part, no more aesthetically attractive than other species, provide
little historical insight, and are on the margins of recreational demand and scientific discov
ery"); Nagle, supra note 42, at 1211-16 (describing the lack of utilitarian value of most species
in greater detail); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Embattled Social Utilities ofthe Endangered Spe
cies Act A Noah Presumption and Caution Against Putting Gasmasks on the Canaries in
the Coalmine, 27 ENVTL. L. 845, 851, 853 (1997) (describing the utilitarian reasons as "make
weights," and suggesting that the utilitarian arguments are "valid, but seem to be somewhat
leveraged, grasping at straws. The vast majority of endangered species probably will not cure
cancer.").
51. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 n.11 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (Wald, J.) (explaining that "every species has a place in the ecosystem"); National
-

October 1998]

The Commerce Clause Meets The Fly

187

appears to exaggerate the indispensability of each species within
an ecosystem. Biologists believe that species come and go all the
time, so it is hard to contend that the disappearance of any one
species is catastrophic. Nor does the ecosystem argument explain
why we need to protect a species that we think we can do without,
or a species that we thought we were doing without already. For
example, the nearest relative to the Fly is extinct, with no apparent
effect on the ecosystem, let alone interstate commerce.s2 Similarly,
several of the species recently proposed for listing as endangered by
the Fish and Wildlife Service were long thought to be extinct, again
without any noticeable adverse consequences for their ecosystem or
for interstate commerce.s3 It is hard to imagine how a species that
has a minor effect on the functioning of its ecosystem nonetheless
exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
And even if a species plays a key role in its ecosystem, the
ecosystem argument connects the species to interstate commerce
only if the ecosystem itself contributes to that commerce.s4 An iso
lated ecosystem may not provide such contributions. Moreover, as
Mark Sagoff argues, the very notion of a static ecosystem is itself
problematic.ss If the Fly disappears, the ecosystem will change.
But if the Fly does not disappear, the ecosystem will change. And if
It

Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1059 {Henderson, J., concurring) (agreeing that "[g]iven
the interconnectedness of species and ecosystems, it is reasonable to conclude that the extinc
tion of one species affects others and their ecosystems and that the protection of a purely
intrastate species (like the Delhi Sands Flower-loving Fly) will therefore substantially affect
land and objects that are involved in interstate co=erce").
52. See FWS Fly Listing Decision, supra note 2, at 49,881 (describing the apparent extinc
tion of the El Segundo Flower-Loving Fly from its historic home in southwestern Los Ange
les County); Brief for Amici Curiae Center for Marine Conservation, Defenders of Wtldlife,
Environmental Defense Fund, National Audubon Society, and World Wtldlife Fund at 3,
National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (No. 96-5354)
[hereinafter Envtl. Brief], available at <http://www.poplarpub.com/flybrf.txt> (explaining that
the El Segundo Flower-Loving Fly was wiped out in the 1960's by urban development).
53. See FWS Deseret Milk-Vetch Listing, supra note 32, at 4,207 (describing a plant that
had been considered extinct for 72 years); Endangered and Threatened Wtldlife and Plants;
Proposed Endangered Status for Erigeron decumbens var. decumbens {Willamette Daisy)
and Fender's Blue Butterfly (lcaricia icarioides fenderi) and Proposed Threatened Status for
Lupinus sulphureus ssp. kincaidii (Kincaid's lupine), 63 Fed. Reg. 3,863, 3,865 (1998) (noting
that Fender's blue butterfly was not seen from 1937 to 1989); Endangered and Threatened
Wtldlife and Plants; Proposed Threatened Status for the Plant Tuelypodium howellii ssp.
spectabilis (Howell's spectacular thelypody), 63 Fed. Reg. 1,948 {1998) {indicating that a
flower had been thought extinct until rediscovered in 1980).
54. See Johnson, supra note 17, at 81 (arguing that the role of a species in its ecosystem
supports federal regulation "to the extent that endangered species live in ecosystems that
produce articles of co=erce, or that are used for co=ercial purposes").
55. See Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurispmdence Meets the En
dangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 931-32 (1997) (describing ecosystems as
"unstructured, transitory, and accidental in nature"); see also id. at 893-902 (noting the diffi
culties inherent in defining an ecosystem).
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we manage to actually increase the population of the Fly, the
ecosystem will change too. Something more, then, is needed to
ground the Fly's Commerce Clause connection on the health of the
ecosystem of which it is a part.
The ecosystem argument works if a species is crucial to an
ecosystem that plays a role in interstate commerce. The brief filed
by the environmental groups intervening on behalf of the Fly claims
just such a connection among the Fly, the Colton Dunes ecosystem
of which it is a part, and the broader economy.56 The Fly serves at
least two functions within the Colton Dunes: it pollinates two na
tive species of plants, and its disappearance sounds an alarm that
the ecosystem itself is in danger.57 The Colton Dunes is important
as one of a decreasing number of isolated ecosystems that are cru
cial to the development of new species. The preservation of the Fly
will assure the preservation of the Colton Dunes, and the preserva
tion of isolated ecosystems like that one provides the requisite
nexus to interstate commerce. But there is no evidence that the
Colton Dunes itself is substantially related to interstate commerce;
its significance lies as a representative example of an isolated
ecosystem. The ecosystem argument on behalf of the Fly, there
fore, requires a showing that isolated ecosystems in general are a
permissible object of Commerce Clause legislation, even absent a
relationship between the Fly's own ecosystem and interstate
commerce.
Judge Wald and Judge Henderson relied upon a second ap
proach for connecting each endangered species to interstate com
merce. The biodiversity argument insists that the availability of a
large number of animal and plant species has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.58 Each species is important under this argu
ment because it is the number of species that matters, not the char
acteristics of any particular species.

Biodiversity is valuable

56. See Envtl. Brief, supra note 52, at 4, 14.
51. The "canary-in-the-mine" function of endangered species refers to the way in which
the loss of one species may serve as an early warning that the rest of the ecosystem is in
danger. See Nagle, supra note 42, at 1210-11. It is one of the most common justifications for
the protection of all endangered species. See id. at 1213 (citing sources).
58. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
{Wald, J.) (concluding that "one of the primary reasons that Congress sought to protect en
dangered species from 'takings' was the importance of the continuing availability of a wide
variety of species to interstate commerce"); 130 F.3d at 1052 (Wald, J.) (noting that "current
and future interstate commerce . . . relies on the availability of a diverse array of species");
130 F.3d at 1053 n.14 {Wald, J.) (asserting that "biodiversity has a real, substantial, and pre
dictable effect on . . . interstate commerce"); 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring)
(agreeing that "the loss of biodiversity itself has a substantial effect on our ecosystem and
likewise on interstate commerce").
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because it improves the probability that we will find a species that
possesses the medicinal, nutritional, or other benefit that we seek.
The likelihood of finding a cure for AIDS or for cancer is greater if
there are millions of species of plants to investigate for possible re
sources instead of only hundreds of species of plants available. Bi
odiversity's value is further demonstrated by the consequences of
its absence. Certain kinds of species provide services that would be
lost even if most other species survived. For example, the Fly is one
of a decreasing number of "native pollinator" species that pollinate
crops throughout the country.59 If the number of such native pol
linator species drops, the billions of dollars of ecological services
they provide will drop too.60
C.

The Relationship Between the Hospital and Interstate
Commerce

The Fly is competing with people who want to occupy its
habitat. San Bernardino County chose the site for its new regional
hospital, and it then needed an electrical power station and a rede
signed intersection to serve the hospital. The construction of the
hospital presumably used materials and workers from outside of
California, and once operating the hospital certainly expected to
attract employees, patients, and students from other states as well.61
The electrical substation constructed in the Fly's habitat no doubt
possessed similar connections to interstate commerce.62 So would
the proposed redesigned traffic intersection.63 The Fly's habitat
also lies within an enterprise zone established to facilitate commer
cial investment in the area.64 The residential housing developers
could be expected to rely upon similar out-of-state materials and
59. See Envtl. Brief, supra note 52, at 4 (crediting the Fly with pollinating buckwheat, and
perhaps croton and telegraph weed as well); id. at 14 (noting that "cashews, squash, mangos,
cardamon, cacao, cranberries, and highbush blueberries are pollinated primarily by wild
insects").
60. See id. at 14.
61. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F3d at 1048 (Wald, J.); see also 130 F.3d at
1059 (Henderson, J., concurring) (agreeing that the intersection and the hospital each have
"an obvious connection with interstate co=erce").
62. See Brief for Appellants at 9-11, National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (No. 96-5354) [hereinafter NAHB Brief], available at <http://
www.poplarpub.com/fly.txt>.
63. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1056 (Wald, J.); 130 F.3d at 1059
(Henderson, J., concurring).
64.

See NAHB Brief, supra note 62, at 13.
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personnel if they were allowed to proceed with their planned con
struction at the site.65
These connections to interstate commerce match the relation
ships that the Court held sufficient in the cases challenging the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The fact that seventy-five percent of the guests
of the Heart of Atlanta Motel were from outside of Georgia and
the proximity of the motel to two interstate highways provided the
necessary substantial effect on interstate commerce. 66

The

purchase of forty-six percent of its meat from a local supplier who
obtained it from outside of Alabama placed Ollie's Barbeque
within the scope of the Commerce Clause power.67 The construc
tion of the hospital, electrical substation, traffic intersection, and
housing developments in the Fly's habitat are thus substantially re
lated to interstate commerce.
* * *

The foregoing discussion reveals three clear relationships to in
terstate commerce:

(1)

endangered species generally are substan

tially related to interstate commerce by virtue of the many
utilitarian roles that they perform;

(2)

someday the Fly could have a

substantial effect on interstate commerce; and

(3) the county hospi

tal and the housing developments desired by the NAHB would rely
upon materials, employees, and other connections to interstate
commerce. By contrast, the Fly itself does not have an actual, sub
stantial effect on interstate commerce, notwithstanding the slight
connections that the government advanced and the district court
cited. Whether

every endangered species is

connected to interstate

commerce because every species plays an irreplaceable role in its
ecosystem is harder to judge. There appear to be many species
without which the ecosystem and interstate commerce would con
tinue unaffected, but Congress apparently concluded otherwise, and
that might be sufficient for a court applying the deferential rational
basis test. The biodiversity argument offers an even more convinc
ing way of emphasizing the importance of the preservation of every
species. But the fact that the answers to these questions are not all
the same shows that the constitutionality of applying the ESA's tak65. See Anne M. Peterson, Federal Permit Required Before Tract Constn1ction: Environ
mentalists Say the Fontana Site is Home of Endangered Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, THE
PRESs-ENTERPRISE, Aug. 20, 1998, at Bl (reporting that the FWS has notified a developer
that it must get a permit before building 202 homes on the habitat of the Fly).
66. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243, 258 (1964).
67. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296, 300-01 (1964).
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ings provision to the development of the Fly's habitat depends upon
the question a court asks.
II.

THE RIGHT QUESTION

That brings us to the "Jeopardy" portion of the article. Having
answered the questions posed above, it remains to determine the
appropriate question. This choice of questions requires considera
tion of three more questions. First, what is the appropriate level of
aggregation when comparing an activity to interstate commerce?
Second, can a potential effect on interstate commerce ever qualify
as a substantial effect? Third, what is the activity that must be con
nected to interstate commerce? Surprisingly, the abundant Com
merce Clause litigation and literature has not resolved any of these
issues. Lopez and the New Deal cases direct their attention else
where, as do most academics. Yet these questions offer the possi
bility of greatly expanding or reducing the scope of the Commerce
Clause, thereby advancing through the back door arguments that
constitutional precedent and theory block directly.
Each of these questions can be answered in a way that affirms
the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the Fly's habitat and count
less other activities wholly unrelated to environmental law, but only
if one is willing to abandon the Court's insistence in Lopez that an
appropriate test for the Commerce Clause cannot justify federal
legislation of everything.68 I will not abandon that principle be
cause it lies at the heart of

Lopez. 69

There are, of course, strong

arguments against that principle and against

Lopez itself.

Perhaps

the Court's insistence that there must be some activities that lie
outside the scope of the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the
terms of the Commerce Clause itself, as Robert Nagel has argued.7°
Perhaps another test would better capture the meaning or purpose
of the Commerce Clause.71 Or perhaps it would be wise for the
68. See supra text accompanying note 14; see also National Assn. of Home Builders, 130
F.3d at 1064 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (reading Lopez to require that "the rationale offered to
support the constitutionality of the statute . . . has a logical stopping point so that the ration
ale is not so broad as to regulate on a similar basis all human endeavors, especially those
traditionally regulated by the states") (citing United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1455-56 (6th
Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J., dissenting in part)).
69. See Merritt, supra note 15, at 686 {observing that the rejection of the idea that Con
gress possesses unlimited power under the Co=erce Clause "may have been the primary
point of the decision"); id. at 712 (suggesting that the same point "may have been the most
influential one of all in Lopez").
70. See Robert F. Nagel, The Future ofFederalism, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 643, 649-55
{1996).
71. For two quite different alternative theories, compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 587-89 (1995) {Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting the extension of the Co=erce Clause
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courts simply to allow Congress to regulate everything that it
wants.72 Each of those views has its proponents, but I do not wish
to enter that debate here. Instead, I presume that the general test
stated in Lopez and the New Deal cases is appropriate, and that
any understanding of that test must conform to the Court's insis
tence that the Commerce Clause cannot be interpreted in a way
that justifies

any federal legislation.

So viewed, the aggregation of all endangered species and the
reliance upon the Fly's unknown future effect on interstate com
merce become problematic because both arguments would justify
any federal legislation. Consideration of the effect of the hospital,
the traffic intersection, and the construction of housing within the
Fly's habitat would be acceptable because that approach posits
other activities that lie outside of the scope of congressional power.
That means, however, that those other activities - especially the
proverbial children walking barefoot through the Fly's habitat could not be regulated by Congress, and an application of the
ESA's takings provision in that context would be unconstitutional.
A.

The Aggregation Problem

The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate three
categories of activity provided that it identifies an adequate rela
tionship to interstate commerce. One way in which Congress can
ensure this relationship is by including a jurisdictional provision
limiting the law's scope to activities that are substantially related to
interstate commerce. The regulations governing the Clean Water
Act, for example, rely on such a provision to guarantee that a regu
lated body of water has the necessary relationship to interstate
commerce.73 The ESA does not contain a jurisdictional provision,
but that alone does not invalidate the statute. The second route
to activities that substantially affect interstate commerce but are not part of interstate com·
merce themselves) with Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power
and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554 (1995) (proposing that
the Commerce Clause should be interpreted to justify federal regulation when there is some
reason to believe that the states cannot handle the matter themselves), and National Assn. of
Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054-55 (Wald, J.) (concluding that the ESA's takings provision is
within the scope of the Commerce Clause because the taking of endangered species results
from destructive interstate competition).
72. See Jesse H. Choper, Did Last Term Reveal "A Revolutionary States' Rights Move·
ment Within the Supreme Court"?, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 663, 669 & n.45 (1996).
73. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3{a) (Army Corps of Engineers, definition); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3{s).
This regulation has been read broadly to cover isolated wetlands and other bodies of water
with tenuous connections to interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d
719, 732-33 (3d Cir. 1993); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 359·60 (9th Cir.
1990); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
998 F. Supp. 946 (N.D. ill. 1998); United States v. Sargent County Water Resource Dist., 876
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available to Congress is to make findings about the effect of mem
bers of the category on interstate commerce. The BSA contains
several findings about the importance of endangered species74 and
about the effects of commercial activity on endangered species,75
but no findings which describe the effects of endangered species on
interstate commerce. The findings in the ESA's legislative history
are more helpful, though, reciting the importance of biodiversity in
providing potential resources for commerce, medicine, and other
human activities.76 To no one's surprise, Congress neglected to
make any findings about the Fly, so the authority to regulate the
Fly's habitat depends upon Congress's ability to act based on the
cumulative effect of other endangered species and of biodiversity as
a whole.
At first glance, this would seem to be easy because of Wickard v.

Filburn. 77

For better or worse - and the Lopez majority would
side with those saying "worse"78
Wickard has come to stand for
-

the proposition that the constitutionality of an exercise of congres
sional power under the Commerce Clause is measured not by an
isolated examination of each individual's actions, but by the aggre
gate effect of all similarly situated actors. This reading of

Wickard

emphasizes that even if the Fly does not exert a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, it is but one of many endangered species
whose collective effect on interstate commerce is unquestionably
substantial.
Th.at comparison blurs the kind of aggregation that the Court
employed in

Wickard.

The statute that Roscoe Filburn was accused

of violating - the Agricultural Adjustment Act of

1938

-

regu

lated the marketing of tobacco, corn, cotton, rice, peanuts, and
F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (D.N.D. 1992). But see United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 255-57 (4th
Cir. 1997); Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 260-62 (7th Cir. 1993).
74. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1985).
.
75. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(l) (finding that species "have been rendered extinct as a con
sequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and con
servation"); H.R. 37, 93d Cong., § 2(a) (1973) (proposing congressional finding that "one of
the unfortunate consequences of growth and development in the United States and else
where has been the extermination of some species or subspecies of fish and wildlife").
76. See H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 5 (1973) (describing species as "potential resources" that
"may provide answers to questions which we have not yet learned to ask" and speculating
about possible medical benefits); S. REP. No. 93-307, at 2 (1973) (indicating that "many of
these animals perform vital biological services to maintain a 'balance of nature' within their
environments" and that biological diversity is needed for scientific purposes).
77. 317 U.S. 111 {1942). For a detailed retelling of the events underlying Wickard, see
Jim Chen, Foreword: Ftlbum's Forgotten Footnote
OfFarm Team Federalism and Its Fate,
82 MINN. L. REv. 249, 276-305 {1997).
78. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (describing Wickard as "perhaps
the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity").
-
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wheat.79 The specific regulation that applied to Filburn governed
only wheat. In

1941,

Mr. Filburn harvested

239

more bushels of

wheat than he was allowed by that regulation, but he contended
that the extra amount was not involved in interstate commerce be
cause he used it on his own farm for livestock feed and for other
personal consumption. Justice Jackson's opinion for the unanimous
Court rejected that argument because the effect of wheat grown for
personal consumption had an effect on interstate commerce by de
flating the demand for - and thus the price of - wheat grown
elsewhere.80 Moreover, the government presented evidence that
wheat grown for personal consumption was "the most variable fac
tor in the disappearance of the wheat crop," with more than twenty
percent of the wheat grown in the United States used for such per
sonal consumption.81 The cumulative effect of wheat grown for
personal use did, therefore, yield a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
That result depended upon an aggregation of the wheat grown
by Filburn for his personal use coupled with the wheat grown by all
other farmers for their personal use. The relevant category, then,
was "all wheat grown by farmers for their personal use." This was
not the broadest possible category. A broader category consistent
with the reach of the statute would have been "all tobacco, corn,
cotton, rice, peanuts, and wheat grown by farmers for their personal
use." An even broader category - albeit one that moves beyond
the commodities covered by the statute - would have encom
passed "all agricultural products produced by farmers for their own
personal use." In other words, the interstate commerce effect
would be measured by adding Filburn's wheat to Filburn's milk and
chicken and eggs,82 to the produce of Iowa corn farmers and North
Carolina tobacco growers and California rice farmers. And it is
that step that is required to move from the Fly to all endangered
species.
Judge Wald appeared to accept the government's argument

National Assn. of Home Builders that the

in

appropriate level of ag

gregation is "all endangered species," the class subject to the ESA's
79. See Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946,
Part Two, 59 HARv. L. REv. 883, 901 (1946).
80. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124-29.
81. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127.
82. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114 (noting that Filburn "for many years past has owned and
operated a small farm in Montgomery County, Ohio, maintaining a herd of dairy cattle, sell
ing milk, raising poultry and selling poultry and eggs").
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Wickard,
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however, did not go so far as to ag

gregate all of the statutorily regulated crops with Mr. Filburn's
wheat. Judge Wald further asserted that

Wickard

is analogous to

the Fly case because Congress enacted the BSA to regulate the
quantity of species, whereas

Wickard

involved the quantity of

wheat.84 She is correct that Congress was concerned about the
quantity of species and that the BSA was designed to protect that
amount. But as applied to the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, the
contested provision of the BSA prohibits the taking of any individ
ual Fly, whether or not the loss of that Fly will result in the extinc
tion of the species. To be sure, Congress might well want to ban the
taking of any Fly because the loss of any individual Fly poses a
serious threat to the existence of the species.85 That, however, is a
slightly different argument than the one advanced by Justice Jack
son.

Wickard

found the requisite connection between interstate

commerce and the wheat consumed by Mr. Filburn on his own farm
because there was a relationship between the nationwide demand
for wheat and the amount of wheat grown for personal use by Mr.
Filburn and others similarly situated. By contrast, if San Bernar"'
dino County's hospital or a new housing development wipes out
one or more Flies without extinguishing the species, there will still
be the same number of species. The analogy to

Wickard requires an

additional step: it is not sufficient to show that the activities of the
county and the home builders and all similarly situated parties will
affeet the number of Flies, but one must also show that their actions
will affect the number of species. Extinction, in other words, affects
interstate commerce, but the loss of an individual Fly does not. The
precarious survival of the Fly suggests that such a fate might quickly
ensue from the loss of one or more Flies, but the Court has indi-

83. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Wald, J.) (describing the class to be aggregated as "all similarly situated endangered spe
cies"); U.S. Brief, supra note 28, at 27 (asserting that "[t]he appropriate analytical framework
aggregates the effects of all conduct within the class of activities regulated by the challenged
statutory provision"). It is conceivable that Judge Wald meant to refer to a narrower class
limited to "similarly situated" endangered species, but she offered no indication of what qual
ified a species as "similarly situated" to the Fly.
84.

See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1049 n.7 (Wald, J.).

85. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052 n.10 (Wald, J.) (writing that
"[a]ctivities that threaten a species' existence threaten to reduce biodiversity and thereby.
have a substantial negative effect on interstate commerce. Thus, the biodiversity rationale
offered here provides support for the Endangered Species Act only insofar as the Act pre
vents activities that are likely to cause the elimination of species."). Note that according to
the government, the opponents of the Fly "appear to concede that if the restrictions of the
[ESA] are lifted, the Fly will become extinct." U.S. Brief, supra note 28, at 35 n.17.
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cated a decided reluctance to add any inferences beyond those al
Wickard. 86

ready made in

The disagreement between Judge Wald and Judge Sentelle
about whether the protection of the Fly's habitat depends upon the
interstate effect of endangered species or of the Fly captures but
two of the possible levels of aggregation. Consider the different
categories that Congress could adopt in an effort to protect the Fly:

(1) An individual Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly - Congress could
decide to protect one individual, and presumably very special, Fly.
That Congress would take this step for an insect that is visible for
only two weeks is doubtful, but it is more plausible that another
animal might receive such consideration. Certain individual ani
mals, like Hsing-Hsing, the panda at the National Zoo, are objects
of particular attention apart from their species.

lation of the Fly

-

(2) A specific popu

Congress could act to protect one colony of Flies

without extending that protection to other colonies. In fact, the
ESA extends its protections to specific populations of wildlife and
fish species that are endangered even if other populations of the
species are thriving, but insects are not eligible for such treatment.87

(3) The Fly

-

Congress could pass the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving

Fly Act, protecting the survival of the Fly and only the Fly. Obvi
ously, such a statute has not yet joined the U.S. Code, but analo
gous statutes already exist.

Congress enacted a Bald Eagle

Protection Act to provide special protection to that one species.88

(4) All flies

-

The next largest aggregation would protect all spe

cies of files. This legislation could either protect every fly species
from extinction, or more broadly, it could protect all files from
86. The final paragraph of the Court's decision in Lopez explains that a decision upholding the challenged statute would require the Court
to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by
the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road,
giving great deference to congressional action. . . . The broad language in these opinions
has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any
further.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 {1995) (citations omitted). Wickard was one of the
"prior cases" referred to by the Court, see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556; indeed, the Court de
scribed Wickard as "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority
over intrastate activity." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
87. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) {1994) {defining "species" to include "any distinct popula
tion segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature");
see also, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Threatened Status for the
Alaska Breeding Population of the Steller's Eider, 62 Fed. Reg. 31,748 (1997) (listing the
population of a sea duck that breeds in Alaska, but declining to list the balance of the species
that lives in Russia).
88. See Bald Eagle Protection Act, ch. 278, § 1, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) (current version at 16
u.s.c. § 668 {1985)).
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harmful activities whether or not the survival of the species is in
doubt. Again, Congress has amended the B ald Eagle Protection
Act to extend coverage to several species of eagles.89 (5) All insects
- Congress could legislate to protect not only flies, but beetles,
bees, and grasshoppers as well. The Marine Mammal Protection
Act is the most analogous existing statute.90 (6) All wildlife
Con
gress could act to save mammals, birds, reptiles, insects and all
-

other wildlife. The ESA does more - the statute also protects
plants - but it also does less - the ESA's protections only apply if
a species has been listed as endangered or threatened. (7) All living
things - Here the statute would cover wildlife, plants, and also vi
ruses and microorganisms. The ESA does not reach this far. (8)
All natural objects - Congress could pass an Earth Preservation
Act that would add rocks, canyons, water, air, and other inanimate
natural objects to the list of protected resources. There is no analo
gous federal or state law.
The question raised by the Fly case is whether a statute based
on a broader aggregation can constitutionally be applied to a nar
row category that lacks the required substantial relationship to in
terstate commerce. The Court has not confronted that question.
Indeed, the Court has said little about how far Congress can reach
in aggregating activities or how one decides what aggregations are
permissible.91 The few available clues counsel against overly broad
aggregations.

Lopez rejects

any Commerce Clause test that every

conceivable federal statute could satisfy.92 The Court's frequently
stated concern about federalism pushes toward less sweeping aggre
gations.93 And lower courts have rejected the contention that Con89. See 16 U.S.C. § 668; see generally MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EvoLUTION OF NATIONAL
(rev. ed. 1983) (describing the history and application of the two eagle
statutes).
90. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1994).
91. Much to the chagrin of constitutional law scholars. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER &
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 191 (13th ed. 1997) (wondering about the
permissible scope of the aggregation theory employed in Wickard); STONE ET AL., supra note
26, at 226 (asking what kinds of aggregation are allowed by Wickard).
92. See supra text accompanying note 14; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
600 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (insisting that "[t]he aggregation principle is clever, but
has no stopping point"); pAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITU
TIONAL DECJSIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 385 (3d ed. 1992) (asking if Wickard's
aggregation principle "leave[s] anything to the requirement that an activity have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce"); Merritt, supra note 15, at 749 (contending that "[b]lindly
transferring the aggregation principle from Wickard to other contexts distorts the meaning of
Wickard and suggests that the decision is much broader than it was intended").
93. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2377-78 n.11 (1997) (describing fed
eralism as "the unique contribution of the Framers to political science and political theory")
(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). The Court, however, has
yet to rely on the teachings of federalism to guide its Commerce Clause aggregation deciWILDLIFE LAW 89-98
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gress can satisfy the Commerce Clause simply by choosing a broad
category of activities whose aggregate effect on interstate com
merce is substantial.94

In that light, the congressional findings

about the effects of endangered species generally do not preclude a
Commerce Clause objection to the use of the takings provision to
regulate the Fly's habitat, or the habitat of any other species with
minimal connections to interstate commerce.
Suppose, for example, that Congress wanted to protect Hsing
Hsing, the panda in the National Zoo, and that it enacted two stat
utes to achieve that end. The Hsing-Hsing Preservation Act, which
makes it illegal to harm Hsing-Hsing, could be supported by find
ings that people come from around the country to visit the pandas
in the National Zoo. The Earth Preservation Act, which makes it
illegal to damage or interfere with any of the natural objects of the
earth, could be defended by findings recording the substantial effect
that water, geological formations, animals, and other natural ob
jects have on interstate commerce. Either law could be constitu
tionally applied to a poacher who shot Hsing-Hsing in the National
Zoo; the panda's connection to interstate commerce is manifest.
Obviously, though, the Earth Preservation Act would cover a host
of other activities. It could, for example, be applied to a Minnesota
company that discharged toxic pollutants into the Mississippi River
to the detriment of businesses and residents in numerous states
downstream. The more difficult Commerce Clause case would in
volve the application of the Earth Preservation Act to an activity
that itself lacked a substantial relationship to interstate commerce,
say a woman who mowed her lawn, thereby damaging a natural
object of the earth. Absent any relationship between the particular
natural object - her lawn - and interstate commerce, that appli
cation would seem to fall beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause.95 If so, then absent any relationship between the Fly and
interstate commerce, the fact that other endangered species are
sions. See STONE ET AL., supra note 26, at 226 (observing that the Court's leading Commerce
Clause decisions "do not discuss the values of federalism as the basis for the choices they
make" about the appropriate level of aggregation).
94. See United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 676 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the govern·
ment's claim that "Congress need only identify a broad 'class of activities' and determine
that, viewed in the aggregate, the class 'substantially affects' interstate commerce," and insist·
ing instead that something relevant must connect the separate incidents and their effects on
interstate commerce), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1189 (1998); United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d
1342, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993) (contending that a "limiting principle must apply to the 'class of
activities' rule, else the reach of the Commerce Clause would be unlimited, for virtually all
legislation is 'class based' in some sense of the term"), atfd., 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
95. The other possibility is that Congress could focus on the interstate connections of the
lawnmower instead of the lawn. See infra text accompanying notes 139-44.
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substantially related to interstate commerce would not be enough
to justify the regulation of the Fly and its habitat.
The biodiversity argument advanced by Judge Wald and Judge
Henderson suffers from the same fl.aw. It is no doubt true, as they
claim, that the loss of any species will diminish the number of re
sources available for interstate commerce.96 It is also true, though,
that any action that harms the earth could diminish the resources
available for interstate commerce. The biodiversity argument
comes close to saying that because the earth is necessary for inter
state commerce, anything that adversely affects the earth can be
regulated by Congress. Indeed, any action that harms anything can
be said to affect interstate commerce because it is hard to imagine
anything that could not serve as a resource used in interstate com
merce. Such a loss of resources argument proceeds from the same
premises that would justify the application of the Earth Preserva
tion Act to any human activity. It would, in short, allow Congress
to do anything.
That is not to say that a regulated party can escape the Com
merce Clause by placing itself in a narrow category that includes
only activities that do not affect interstate commerce. That ploy has
not worked.97 But suppose that Congress itself were to choose a
narrow category. If Congress passed a Delhi Sands Flower-Loving
Fly Act that specifically sought to preserve the habitat of the Fly,
and only the Fly, then the aggregation principle would not save that
statute. Assuming that any congressional findings accompanying a
statute directed at the Fly would discuss that species instead of en
dangered species in general, the case for linking the Fly to interstate
commerce fails.98 But if Congress lacks the power to protect the
Fly's habitat by enacting a statute specifically designed to achieve
that goal, the case for allowing the BSA to be applied to the Fly's
habitat would result in Congress being able to accomplish througp. a
broad statute what it could not do with a narrow one. Something is
96.

See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.

97. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.) (re
jecting a narrow aggregation under the federal arson statute because "[c]ategorize finely
enough and the interstate effects evaporate and the statute is nullified"), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 2425 (1997); Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1996) (refusing to charac
terize the appropriate category as the cultivation of marijuana without the intent to distribute
because "[a]ny class of economic activities could be defined so narrowly as to cover only
those activities that do not have a substantial impact on interstate commerce"); United States
v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 734 (3d Cir. 1993) (contending that Wickard does not require "a
showing of local or regional aggregation," and thus evaluating the cumulative effects of filling
wetlands across the country).
98. The case would succeed if the biodiversity argument was available, but there are diffi
culties confronting that argument. See supra text accompanying note 96.
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odd about conditioning the Commerce Clause power to accomplish
a certain goal on Congress legislating far more broadly than
necessary.
Odd or not, a prominent strand in Commerce Clause jurispru
dence leads toward that result. Judge Wald defended her focus on
endangered species generally as sufficient to justify the regulation
of the Fly's habitat by quoting part of the Court's admonition that
"where a general regulatory scheme bears a substantial relation to
commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising
under the statute is of no consequence."99 Or as the Court put it
when it upheld the application of the federal loansharking statute to
a local extortionist in Perez v. United States, 100 if a statute regulates
a "class of activities . . . within the reach of the federal power, the
courts have no power 'to excise as trivial, individual instances' of
the class. " 101 Both statements recognize that Congress is not only
empowered to regulate interstate commerce, but also to enact stat
utes that are necessary and proper to effectuate that power. The
BSA establishes a general regulatory scheme that is related to com
merce, so the intrastate and noncommercial nature of the Fly (and
other species) could be irrelevant.
The reading of both statements needed to make the particular
characteristics of the Fly irrelevant raises a number of problems.
Both statements depend upon the same broad reading of the activi
ties that can be aggregated under Wickard described above. 102
Both statements :first appeared in

Maryland v. Wirtz103 in a context
Wickard. Wirtz sustained

that casts doubt upon a broad reading of

the extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act - originally upheld
in the classic New Deal case of

United States v. Darby104

-

to em

ployees of any enterprise engaged in interstate commerce. Justice
Douglas feared that the enterprise concept could allow Congress to
"devour the essentials of state sovereignty." 105 But the Court as
sured him that that was a misreading of

Wickard:

Neither here nor in Wickard had the Court declared that Congress
may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for
broad general regulation of state or private activities. Tue Court has
99. National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1046, 1053 n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (Wald, J.) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)).
100. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
101.
102.

Perez, 402 U.S. at 154 (emphasis omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.

103. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
104. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
105.

Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 205 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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only said that where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial
relation to interstate commerce, the de minimis character of individ
ual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence .106

Actually, that is not too reassuring. It virtually invites Congress to
legislate as broadly as possible: a statute will fall if the trivial im
pacts dominate the substantial impacts, but a statute will survive if
the substantial impacts dominate the trivial ones. In other words, if
Congress gathers enough substantial impacts into the covered class,
the trivial impacts can be regulated, too. Even so, it is not obvious
that the substantial impacts associated with the ESA's takings pro
vision prevail over the trivial impacts. The parties to the Fly case
agreed that the constitutionality of the application of the statute to
the Fly would decide the constitutionality of the statute as applied
to other intrastate species, yet fully half of the listed species live in
only one state.107
The contention that Congress can regulate trivial and de
minimis activities that are unrelated to interstate commerce sheds
some light on an unexplained phenomenon: the absence of success

ful as-applied challenges in Commerce Clause cases. Most constitu
tional litigation is divided into facial challenges to an entire statute
and individual challenges to particular applications of the statute,
with the failure of a facial challenge in no way precluding a subse
quent as-applied challenge. Not so in Commerce Clause cases.
Courts often say that they are considering the constitutionality of a
particular application of a statute under the Commerce Clause the Fly case itself is an example108 - but the fact that trivial in
stances and de minimis applications are nonetheless within the
scope of congressional power invariably dooms such challenges.
The Court decides the constitutionality of legislation under the
106. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196 n.27.
107. See Envtl. Brief, supra note 52, at 1 (contending that the case "is about all of the
more than 500 species that occur in only a single state, for the if the Constitution prevents the
federal government from extending meaningful protection to the Delhi Sands flower-loving
fly, then it almost certainly prevents that same government from extending such protection to
the others"); U.S. Brief, supra note 28, at 1 (describing the issue presented in the case as
"[w]hether Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to prevent the extinction of
species by prohibiting takings of species listed as endangered, even where a particular species
lives entirely within one State"); NAHB Brief, supra note 62, at 17 (indicating that the mu
nicipalities and developers "challenge[d] the authority of the federal government to regulate
the use of non-federal lands in order to protect a species of Fly that is found only in
California").
108. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1040, 1043 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (Wald, J.) (indicating that the appellants challenged an application of the ESA's tak
ings provision); see also United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining
how to decide as-applied challenges to a statute possessing a jurisdictional element); Building
Indus. Assn. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 908 (D.D.C. 1997) (describing an as-applied chal
lenge to the ESA's takings provision).
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Commerce Clause on an all-or-nothing basis. But it does not say
why.
Even so, the de rninirnis applications and trivial instances lan
guage does not allow Congress to regulate anything so long as the
substantial effects of an activity on interstate commerce are greater
than the trivial effects. Consider the meaning of the necessary and
proper clause in this context. Justice Black once wrote that "it has
long been held that the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . adds to
the commerce power of Congress the power to regulate local instru
mentalities operating within a single State if their activities burden
the flow of commerce among the States. " 109 So stated, the Neces
sary and Proper Clause explains the substantial effects test - the
third prong of Lopez
but it still requires a showing that the regu
lated activity affects interstate commerce when aggregated with
similar activities. The activities must still be similar, so the aggrega
tion question still remains. A broad reading of what is necessary
and proper would justify, for example, the regulation of any activity
affecting any natural object pursuant to the Earth Preservation Act
hypothesized above. It thus violates the Lopez command that a
permissible Commerce Clause test cannot allow Congress to regu
late everything.
-

What, then, do the de minimis and trivial instances statements
mean? The best explanation appears in Judge Baldock's opinion
sustaining an application of the Hobbs Act: "if a statute regulates
an activity which, through repetition, in aggregate has a substantial
affect on interstate commerce . . . 'the de minimis character of indi
vidual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence. ' "110
This reading clarifies that the de rninirnis principle attaches only
after the threshold determination has been made that the aggre
gated effects on the activity on interstate commerce are substantial.
That requires the appropriate level of aggregation to be decided
first, and if the effects of the activity once aggregated are substan
tial, the fact that a particular case involves an instance that does not
itself affect interstate commerce does not push that instance outside
the scope of congressional power. Again, as Judge Baldock ex
plains, Lopez does not "require the· government to show that indi
vidual instances of the regulated activity substantially affect
commerce. " 111 Thus the fact that one individual Delhi Sands
109. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
concurring).
110. United States
111.

v.

v.

United States, 379 U.S. 241, 271 (1964) (Black,

Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995).

Bolton, 68 F.3d at 399.

J.,
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Flower-Loving Fly, or grizzly bear, or bald eagle is not related to
interstate commerce does not limit the scope of the ESA's takings
provision so long as the individual is part of a group whose aggre
gate effect on interstate commerce is substantial.
That approach reconciles the

Lopez

insistence on a Commerce

Clause test that does not justify every federal statute with the Lo
pez acceptance of the de rninirnis application principle. But the
Supreme Court has never stated this view, and it is not the only
possible reading of the contested statements. Judge Wald's broader
approach to aggregation and her reading of the de minimis princi
ple draws some support from cases in other contexts that decline to
inquire about the specific regulated activity so long as a general fed
eral statute imposes the regulation. CERCLA, for example, im
poses liability on parties who were involved in the disposal of
hazardous wastes. Most courts to consider commerce challenges to
the statute have inquired about the relationship between the im
proper disposal of hazardous wastes and interstate commerce.112
The only court of appeals to consider the issue relied upon a nar
rower category - the disposal of hazardous waste at the site of
production - though the court found it unnecessary to actually de
cide the appropriate category.113 No court has demanded proof of
the relationship between the particular hazardous waste disposed
by the defendant and interstate commerce, nor has any court taken
the additional step of requiring a connection between a particular
kind of hazardous waste - such as PCBs, zinc, lead, arsenic - and
interstate commerce. Similarly, many civil rights statutes aggregate
the effects of discrimination based on race, sex, age, and other bi
ases without any suggestion that a narrower category - say, only
race

discrimination - is

appropriate

for

Commerce

Clause

purposes.
That does not mean that all endangered species can be treated
alike, though. Each type of discrimination exists in eacQ. state; there
is no intrastate type of discrimination paralleling the existence of
endangered species that live in only one state. Nor is there any
thing special about each specific hazardous substance, whereas the
reason for protecting endangered species is that each species is
unique. We may not be concerned if a deer gets killed because
112. See, e.g., Nova Chem. Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098, 1106 (E.D. Tenn. 1996);
United States v. NL Indus., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 545, 562 (S.D. Ill. 1996); United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., No. 87-CV-920, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16358, at *19-*20 (N.D.N.Y. Oct.
25, 1996); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Agway, Inc., No. 92-CV-0748, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14196,
at *30-*33 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1996).
113. See United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1510

&

n.8 (11th Cir. 1997).
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there are plenty of other deer, but if a Fly - or worse, a bald eagle
- gets killed, we worry because that could lead to the extinction of
the species. It is the loss of a species and its effect on biodiversity
that concerns us more than the loss of an individual animal, plant,
or insect.
In sum, the effort to employ the aggregation principle to use the
effects of endangered species generally on interstate commerce to

justify the regulation of the Fly's habitat fails because that kind of
aggregation would justify any federal legislation. Lopez teaches
that such a result is impermissible. The narrowest view of aggrega
tion is misplaced, too, because it would demand a showing of a rela
tionship to interstate commerce in every individual case. That is
the equivalent of requiring each federal statute to contain a jurisdic
tional statement, but Lopez did not go so far as to hold that such a
jurisdictional statement is the only way to comply with the limits of
the Commerce Clause. The correct answer lies somewhere in the
middle, between aggregating everything and aggregating nothing,
with Congress given deference to choose what activities to combine
- provided it explains why.
B.

The Potential Effect Problem

Even if we do not receive any benefit from the Fly now, it is
possible that in the future the Fly could become valuable to human
society and exert a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 114
Congress was well aware of "the unknown uses that endangered
species might have and about the unforeseeable place such crea
tures may have in the chain of life on this planet. " 115 The stories of
other species that were once thought worthless but which later
yielded valuable medicinal, nutritional and other services counsel
humility before one dismisses the potential benefits of the Fly. But
the potential effect argument will always be available because any
thing is possible. It was conceivable that the possession of guns
near a school could have a dramatic effect on interstate commerce,
yet that speculative possibility was not enough to persuade the
114. It is also possible that the Fly is already related to interstate commerce, but our
limited understanding of natural processes prevents us from realizing that fact. That is the
essence of Judge Wald's ecosystem argument: every species, including the Fly, has an actual
effect on interstate commerce because every species is crucial to its ecosystem. That argu
ment differs from the one discussed in this section because here I consider potential effects of
the Fly that do not yet exist.
115. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178-79 (1978); see also National Assn.
of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F3d 1040, 1050-52 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Wald, J.) (citing con
gressional committee reports reciting the potential effects of endangered species).
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Court that the Commerce Clause justified the statute in Lopez. In
deed, the scenario described in Lopez sounds more likely than the
potential dire consequences of the loss of the Fly. So the potential
effect argument must overcome the twin obstacles of transgressing
the Lopez prohibition on a Commerce Clause test that justifies any
federal statute and rendering Lopez itself wrongly decided.
Most lower courts have not let those details stand in their way,
especially in environmental cases.116 This trend may be changing in
light of the recent invalidation of the regulation extending the juris
diction of the Clean Water Act to wetlands that "could" be in
volved in interstate commerce.117 Judge Sentelle was even more
skeptical of relying upon anything short of an actual and ongoing
effect on interstate commerce in the Fly case. He reasoned that
because the Fly is not interstate, and the Fly is not commerce, the
Fly cannot be interstate commerce.118 But that argument proves far
too much. The very fact that a species has become endangered
maximizes the likelihood that the species lives in only one state and
that there is no commerce in the species. Indeed, almost half of the
species protected by the ESA survive in only one state.119 Hawaii
has the most endangered species,120 and is the state that is least
likely to witness the travel of such species across state lines. The
plants that are protected by the BSA are limited in their ability to
move across state lines. And while some endangered species pos
sess tremendous value in the black market as they become rarer,
116. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the
Eagle Protection Act because "[e]xtinction of the eagle would substantially affect interstate
commerce by foreclosing any possibility of several types of commercial activity"); Cooper
Indus., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14196, at *30 (holding the Commerce Clause empowers Con
gress to regulate the disposal of hazardous wastes where there is a threat of water pollution);
United States v. Sargent County Water Resource Dist., 876 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (D.N.D.
1992) (finding that the Clean Water Act applies to isolated wetlands in part because of their
"[p]otential rather than actual use by interstate travelers for recreational purposes . . . . );
Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 995 (D. Haw. 1979)
(upholding the ESA because it "preserves the possibilities of interstate commerce in these
species and of interstate movement of persons" who would visit them), affd., 639 F.2d 495
(9th Cir. 1981).
117. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1997); see also United States
v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125, 132-33 (6th Cir. 1996) (Batchelder, J., dissenting) (concluding that
the fact that "many things, and for that matter, most people, 'retain the inherentpotential to
affect commerce' . . . . cannot suffice to give Congress the power to regulate or protect
them").
118. See National Assn. of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1061 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (in
sisting that "the chances of validly regulating something which is neither commerce nor inter
state under the heading of the interstate commerce power must . . . be an empty recitation").
119. See Envtl. Brief, supra note 52, at 2.
120. See U.S. Fish & Wtldlife Service, Listed Species By State!Territory as of June 30,
1998, available at <http://www.fws.gov.r9endsppilistmap.html> (indicating that 298 different
species listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA live in Hawaii).
"
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the same scarcity reduces the amount of commerce that can actually
occur in a species. In short, if the constitutionality of protecting an
endangered species requires that the species be widespread and fa
miliar to consumers, maybe our constitutional jurisprudence has
achieved terminal silliness after all.121
The dilemma, therefore, is to avoid either a Commerce Clause
test that empowers Congress to regulate any potential effects or a
test that denies Congress power unless an activity is currently in
volved in interstate commerce. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce
Commission122 suggests a solution. In Preseault, the Court rejected
a Commerce Clause challenge to the National Trail System Act
Amendments of 1983, which Congress enacted to preserve railroad
rights-of-way that are not currently in service. The Court held that
the statute was permissible under the Commerce Clause because it
was "reasonably adapted to the goal of encouraging the develop
ment of additional recreational trails."123 Further, the Court held
that Congress could protect the rights-of-way for future railroad use
because "Congress apparently believed that every line is a poten
tially valuable national asset that merits preservation even if no fu
ture rail use for it is currently foreseeable."124 Thus the
government and the environmentalists in the Fly case relied on
Preseault for the proposition that the protection of potential future
value in interstate commerce is within Congress's authority under
the Commerce Clause.125
A potential effect on interstate commerce moves a step beyond
an actual effect on interstate commerce, and the Court might not be
willing to take that step. It becomes more attractive, though, as the
likelihood that the effect will actually materialize increases. The
statute in Preseault relied upon a future effect that, while not cur
rently foreseeable, was predicated on the occurrence of the identi
cal effect before. The protected land had been used for railroads in
121. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 {1996) {Scalia, J., dissenting). I am not the
first to make this observation. See Building Indus. Assn. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 908
{D.D.C. 1997).
122. 494 U.S. 1 {1990).
123. Preseault, 494 U.S. at 18; see also 494 U.S. at 18 {describing the congressional intent
'"to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service, to pro
tect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient transportation use'" as
"valid congressional objectives") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 98-28, at 8 (1983) and S. REP. No.
98-1, at 9 {1983)).
124. Preseault, 494 U.S. at 19.
125. See Envtl. Brief, supra note 52, at 11; U.S. Brief, supra note 28, at 19-20. The gov
ernment also cited Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 325-26 (1981), as an example of the Court
upholding congressional authority to protect prime farm land. See U.S. Brief, supra note 28,
at 20.
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the past, and the continued existence of the rights-of-way supported
the probability that the land would be used that way again. Such
knowledge of a past effect on interstate commerce distinguishes

Preseault,

and a Commerce Clause test fashioned upon it, from a
general willingness to allow Congress to enact any legislation based
on speculation that an effect on interstate commerce will occur at
some point in the future.
This approach will produce mixed results for the ESA's takings
provision. For species that were once involved in interstate com
merce, the probability of a future effect is high if the BSA achieves

its goal of eliminating the threat to the species. Eagles fall in this
category,126 as do alligators and gray whales.127 For species like the
Fly that were never involved in interstate commerce, the
probability of a future effect is much lower and depends upon the
discovery of a value that heretofore has been hidden. There are
probably more of the latter kind of species than the former. The
ability to regulate those species that have never affected interstate
commerce necessitates either a broad aggregation principle such as
that questioned above, or a broad reading of the ability of Congress
to regulate future, yet substantial, effects.
Thus Congress should be able to use its Commerce Clause
power to regulate some but not all future substantial effects on in
terstate commerce. Insisting upon a sufficient likelihood that the
expected substantial effect will actually occur avoids the Lopez fear
of allowing Congress to do anything in the name of what might hap
pen someday. Congressional findings take on an added importance
in this context as a way of demonstrating to the Court that even
though the requisite effect has yet to occur, there is good reason to
believe that it will . With no such reason for anticipating that the
Fly will have such an effect on interstate commerce, the future ef
fect must come instead from the lessons of endangered species gen
erally, which requires the invocation of the aggregation principle.
But that principle cannot be stretched to protect the Fly.

126. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the
Eagle Protection Act because "[e]xtinction of the eagle would substantially affect interstate
commerce by foreclosing any possibili,ty of several types of commercial activity"); United
States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237, 1244 (D. Or. 1996) (sustaining federal protection of
eagles because eagle parts have been involved in interstate commerce).
127. See U.S. Brief, supra note 28, at 20 n.9.
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The Choice of Activity Problem

Though they reached different conclusions, Judge Sentelle and
Judge Wald both concentrated on the relationship between the ob
ject of congressional protection - endangered species - and inter
state commerce. Judge Henderson, by contrast, focused on the
activities that threatened to doom the Fly. The difference is stark.
If the connection between the hospital and interstate commerce is
sufficient, then most of Judge Wald's opinion was unnecessary, and
most of Judge Sentelle's dissent was misdirected.
The appeal of this approach grows when it is compared to the
actual strictures of the ESA. The challenged provision of the stat
ute, as interpreted by the Fish & Wildlife Service, forbids any action
that substantially interferes with the habitat of an endangered spe
cies. Building a hospital on top of one of the few remaining homes
of the Fly falls within that provision, as does building a residential
subdivision in the same place. San Bernardino and the home build
ers desire to engage in activities that the ESA's takings 'provision
prohibits. Their activities, moreover, would substantially affect in
terstate commerce. The analysis is exceptionally straightforward,
but it indicates that Judge Henderson was right.
Further proof comes from the Court's decisions upholding stat
utes that prohibit the use of the channels of interstate commerce for
purposes that Congress deems immoral. Congress has enacted stat
utes prohibiting the transportation of numerous people and things
across state lines for immoral purposes, and the Court has sustained
them all.128 In each instance, the statute is motivated by a desire to
protect someone or something that is affected by commerce, rather
than something that affects commerce itself. The ESA's takings
provision operates in the same manner. For many, the extinction of
a species is an immoral act that should be excluded from interstate
commerce to the extent possible. Bans on the sale of an endan
gered species are the most obvious way of keeping rare animals and
plants out of interstate commerce, but they are not the only way.
The takings provision serves the same purpose to the extent that it
applies to activities - like the construction of a hospital or a subdi128. See, e.g., Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936) (applying a federal kidnapping
statute); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the White Slave Traffic Act's
prohibition on taking a woman across state lines for immoral purposes); Champion v. Ames
{The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding a federal anti-lottery statute); see also
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 91, at 195 (noting that "the 'end' which is invoked in
[Darby] to justify the local 'means' is the relationship of the local sanction to the ban on
interstate shipments (not the relationship between the regulated local activity and a national
commercial problem)").
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vision - that rely upon materials and workers involved in inter
state commerce. Recall that the ESA's takings provision states that
it is illegal "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."129
The prohibition refers to those who engage in the harmful conduct,
not to the protected species themselves. It regulates activities like
building a hospital in the Fly's habitat; it does not regulate the Fly
itself. As far as the law is concerned, the Fly is free to do whatever
it wants.
The takings provision reveals the ambiguity in the definition of
the "activity" that substantially affects interstate commerce. This
choice of activities problem necessitates an often unconscious deci
sion to focus on a statute's means or a statute's ends for purposes of
measuring the relationship of the activity to interstate commerce.
Consider the challenges to the Freedom of Access to Clinic En
trances Act (FACE),13o the statute enacted by Congress in

1994

in

response to protests at abortion clinics. FACE criminalizes a vari
ety of threatening activities that impede access to or intentionally
damage abortion clinics. The statute has been challenged on Com
merce Clause grounds, albeit unsuccessfully, by protesters whose
conduct has ranged from peaceful to violent. When looking for the
requisite connection to interstate commerce, most courts have em
phasized the ways in which the clinics are related to interstate com
merce.131 Only occasionally has a court considered the relationship
between the protesters and interstate commerce.132
In this context, FACE stands on stronger ground if the relevant
activity is defined by reference to the ends of the statute rather than
129. 16 u.s.c. § 1532(19) (1994).
130. 18 u.s.c. § 248 (1994).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Westin, No. 97-1348, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 20753, at *6
(2d Cir. Aug. 25, 1998); Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 587 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 118 S.
Ct. 1838 (1998); United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 677-82 (5th Cir. 1997); Terry v. Reno, 101
F.3d 1412, 1415-18 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 2431 (1997); United States v.
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919-20 (8th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 613 (1996); United
States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 680-83 (7th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 47 (1996); Cheffer
v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Bird, 124 F.3d at 674-75 (noting the
absence of evidence that the particular clinic involved in the case had any relationship to
interstate commerce).
132. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 692 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the regulation ap
plies to the activity of the demonstrators, not to the activity of the clinic itself'); United States
v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 630 n.16 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (asserting that "FACE does not regu
late abortion clinics, it regulates abortion protests"), revd., 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995); see
also Terry, 101 F.3d at 1417 (declining to address whether FACE regulates protests instead of
abortion clinics). Judge Wald characterized the activity at issue in the FACE cases as "intra
state, noncommercial protest activity." National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d
1041, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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its means. It is easier to make the link between abortion clinics and
interstate commerce than to make the link between abortion
protesters and interstate commerce.133 This is the opposite of the
BSA, where the means of the statute - prohibiting habitat destruc
tion - are more closely related to interstate commerce than the
end of protecting endangered species, however local the species
may be. In other words, FACE protects a typically interstate activ
ity by regulating typically intrastate actors, while the BSA protects
typically intrastate creatures by regulating typically interstate
activity.
The FAGB cases could suggest that the activity that must be
substantially related to interstate commerce is defined by the ends
of the statute, rather than its means. If that were so, then the ap
propriate question under the BSA is whether an endangered spe
cies has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, so Judge
Henderson's focus would be wrong. But either the means or the
ends should be able to provide the requisite connection to interstate
commerce. Surely the fact that a species is sold in stores across the
country serves to justify congressional regulation of that species.
Th.at being so, the fact that an interstate activity threatens an intra
state species suffices under the Commerce Clause too. If, for exam
ple, Congress enacted a statute providing that "the construction of
any facility with a substantial relationship to interstate commerce
shall be illegal if such construction threatens the habitat of an en
dangered species," that would seem to fall squarely within the third
line of cases listed in

Lopez

(and perhaps the other two lines of

cases as well).134 The application of the BSA to the construction of
a hospital or a housing development in the Fly's habitat is indistin
guishable from that hypothetical statute.
San Bernardino County loses on this view because of the sub
stantial relationship of the hospital to interstate commerce. Th.at
effect also means that Congress has the power to regulate all of the
hospital's activities, ranging from environmental to employment to
health concerns, so long as Congress acts consistently with other
constitutional provisions.

A theory that empowers Congress to
adopt such all encompassing regulation will surely offend some, but

133. The point is relative: some abortion protesters have a substantial relationship to
interstate commerce themselves, but many more abortion clinics have a much stronger
relationship.
134. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,' 558-59 (1995) (stating that "Congress'
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial rela·
tionship to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate com
merce" (citations omitted)).
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the specter of such sweeping federal regulation would come as no
surprise to any hospital administrator. The housing construction,
electrical substation, traffic intersection and similar activities pro
posed by the NAHB and the other opponents of the Fly would like
wise fall within the scope of the Commerce Clause.
That does not mean that Congress can prohibit all of the activi
ties that threaten the Fly's habitat. Judge Henderson and Judge
Wald both emphasized that their theories allowed federal regula
tion only where it was interstate commerce that threatened an en
dangered species.135 Takings of endangered species habitat that do
not result from such interstate commercial activities lie beyond
Congress's power. Three of the threats to the Fly's habitat illus
trate the kinds of issues this distinction raises. The Fly suffers from

(1)

the recreational use of off-road vehicles (ORVs) that crush the

Fly's habitat and interfere with its breeding,

(2)

the presence of

non-native plants that alter the ecological balance upon which the
Fly depends, and (3) the trampling of land - or Flies themselves by people walking in the area.136 These activities raise difficult
Commerce Clause questions even under the theory that allows
Congress to regulate the hospital and other construction within the
Fly's habitat.
The hardest case for Congress to regulate would involve chil
dren walking barefoot across the Fly's habitat on their way to
school.

Lopez

holds that any relationship to the school is inade

quate to support Commerce Clause jurisdiction,137 and the children
themselves offer no alternative justification for federal legislation.
Transplanting a mustard plant from one's garden into the Fly's

135. See National Assn. ofHome Builders, 130 F.3d at 1048 (Wald, J.) (finding the takings
provision within congressional authority in cases "where the pressures of interstate com
merce place the existence of the species in peril"); 130 F.3d at 1059 (Henderson, J., concur
ring) (noting that the takings provision "here acts to regulate commercial development of the
land inhabited by the endangered species"); 130 F.3d at 1060 n.6 (Henderson, J., concurring)
(explaining that "[t]he rationale on which I rely permits regulation only of activities (includ
ing land use) that adversely affect species that affect, or are involved in, interstate com
merce"). Note that while the latter statement in Judge Henderson's opinion is ambiguous,
the context shows that she must mean that the activities, not the species, "affect, or are in
volved in, interstate commerce."
136. See FWS Fly Listing Decision, supra note 2, at 49,884; FLY DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN,
supra note 2, at 13-14 (detailing these threats to the Fly); see also FWS Fly Listing Decision,
supra note 2, at 49,881 (advising that all of the five remaining populations of the Fly "are
threatened by urban development activities").
137. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-66 (rejecting the government's argument that possession
of a firearm in a local school zone substantially affects interstate commerce).
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habitat presents a similarly problematic case.138 If the Commerce
Clause reaches such activities, then it reaches anything.
It is not much easier to reach the ORV users, other trampling
activities, and other ways of introducing non-native plants. Presum
ably, the ORV users enjoy their vehicles within the borders of Cali
fornia, and it is even more likely that anyone walking through the
Fly's habitat will stay within the state. Thus the only way that Con
gress could reach such activity would be to regulate based on the
interstate movement of the equipment itself. Most ORV manufac
turers are located outside of California, so Congress could attempt
to regulate the use of ORV's in endangered species habitat in the
same way that Congress regulates a hospital because of its inter
state connections. But that principle could be stretched to the point
at which Congress could regulate anything. Children who trample
the Fly's habitat on their way to school would seem to be the quin
tessential local activity outside the scope of the Commerce Clause,
but one can imagine Congress trying to reach even that activity
based on the out-of-state manufacturer of the children's Nike shoes
- and the shoes quite literally would be the instruments of the
habitat's destruction.139 The same theory would hold that planting
a

49¢ packet

of mustard seeds bought at a local hardware store but

produced out-of-state is within the scope of the Commerce Clause.
These cases take the Commerce Clause a step beyond the regu
lation of the hospital, the traffic intersections, and the construction
of the residential subdivisions. Interstate commerce plays an ongo
ing role in each of those cases: doctors and patients and suppliers
travel to the hospital once it is operating, cars on interstate trips use
the roads, and the construction of residential homes involves mater
ials and workers from outside of California. Likewise, the hotel
and restaurant at issue in the Civil Rights Act cases relied upon out
of-state guests and food, respectively, on a continuing basis. The
ORV users, children wearing Nike shoes, and gardeners planting
seeds are different. The interstate connection in each of those cases
has ceased. To allow Congress to regulate those activities anyway
would, in Professor Gunther's words, drain the substantive content

138. See FLY DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN; supra note 2, at 13 (noting that non-native plants
such as mustard, Russian thistle, horehound, cheeseweed and many species of introduced
grasses severely degrade the Fly's habitat because theY. affect the soil and available moisture).
139. Cf. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. REs. L.
Rav. 685, 686 (1996) (speculating about whether the Commerce Clause allows Congress to
regulate someone wearing moccasins in their own home).
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of the Commerce Clause "beyond any pdint yet reached."140 It
nears, and may transgress, the

Lopez

command against a test that

allows Congress to regulate anything.
The ORV users, trampling children, and gardeners demonstrate
the difficulty of drawing a clear line between what is substantially
affected by interstate commerce and what is not. I do not offer such
a line here. I do have an answer, though, albeit one based on an
other notoriously vague concept:

proximate cause.

Professor

Merritt has argued that these kinds of determinations should be
made according to traditional proximate cause principles.141 A sub
stantial effect exists where "the relationship between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce [is] strong enough or close enough
to justify federal intervention."142 Such a proximate cause test ex
plains why Congress cannot rely on the Nike shoes worn by a
school child to regulate the child's trampling of the Fly's habitat. In
tort law, proximate cause principles would prevent Nike from being
held liable if a child kicked and injured a classmate, even if the child
was wearing Air Jordans at the time. So, too, the step from the
child's actions to the provenance of the shoes would be beyond the
reach of Congress under a proximate cause test for the Commerce
Clause. Such a proximate cause determination is particularly suited
for the ESA's takings provision because the substantive reach of
the statute is already influenced by notions of proximate cause.143
140. BREST & LEVINSON, supra note 92, at 399 {quoting a June 5, 1963 letter from Gerald
Gunther to the Department of Justice regarding the proposed Civil Rights Act which stated
that "the substantive content of the commerce clause would have to be drained beyond any
point yet reached to justify the simplistic argument that all interstate activity may be sub
jected to any kind of national regulation merely because some formal crossing of an inter
state boundary once took place, without regard to the relationship between the aim of the
regulation and interstate trade"). Tue inadequacy of these kinds of relationships is further
illustrated by the cases where the connection to interstate commerce did not even satisfy the
minimal requirements of a statute containing a jurisdictional statement. See, e.g., United
States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328, 330-31 (11th Cir. 1996) {holding that delivering memos printed
on a home computer to colleagues at work did not provide a sufficient nexus to interstate
commerce); United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 526-27 (9th Cir. 1995) {holding that
the provision of natural gas from out-of-state did not place a residential home within the
scope of the Commerce Clause).
141. See Merritt, supra note 139, at 691-92; Merritt, supra note 15, at 678-82; see also
United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 189 {7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.) (commenting that the
Commerce Clause argument rejected in United States v. Lopez would require "a pretty elon
gated and speculative chain of causation, which if accepted might allow Congress to regulate
any activity at all").
142. Merritt, supra note 15, at 679; see also id. at 681 {indicating that "some measure of
the directness of the effect on interstate commerce" is part of this test and that a host of
factors are relevant in determining whether the requisite proximity exists). A proximate
cause test would thus avoid comparisons of Commerce Clause jurisprudence to the six de
grees of Kevin Bacon game. See Linehan, supra note 17, at 382 & n.107.
143. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S.
687, 711-14 {1995) {O'Connor, J., concurring). But see 515 U.S. at 733-36 {Scalia, J., dissent-
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The idea has broader significance, though, because it offers a means
by which activities affected by interstate commerce can be sepa
rated from those that are not. That separation, in tum, answers
Judge Sentelle's concern that allowing Congress to regulate activi
ties affected by interstate commerce, instead of those that affect in
terstate commerce, places everything within the scope of the
Commerce Clause.144
III.

CONCLUSION

The Fly is a relative latecomer to our nation's debate over Con
gress's commerce power. It raises new questions, though, that tran
scend the traditional disputes about the meaning of commerce and
the amount of effect needed to invoke congressional authority.
Those questions do not necessarily lend themselves to answers that
justify the ESA's protection of the Fly. Judge Wald's need to rely
upon a broad aggregation principle and the potential effects of the
Fly reveals the inability of the Court's existing precedents to readily
encompass the Fly. If Lopez was serious about rejecting any under
standing of the Commerce Clause that would justify any federal ac
tion, then the focus of Judge Wald's opinion may not save the Fly.
Judge Henderson suffers from no such problem. The hospital is en
gaged in interstate commerce, the hospital could wipe out the Fly,
so the hospital may be subjected to the regulation of the BSA. By
contrast, activities that lack a substantial relationship to interstate
commerce lie outside the scope of the Commerce Clause no matter
how damaging they are to the Fly.
Even if Judge Sentelle's analysis prevails and the Supreme
Court holds in a future case that the Commerce Clause does not
authorize the application of the BSA to the habitat of species that
are located in only one state, that would not doom federal efforts to
protect endangered species. The takings provision might be defen
sible under the treaty power or under the Property Clause.145 Al
ternately, the BSA bans trade in endangered species, which even
ing) (questioning the use of causation principles when interpreting the ESA's takings
provision).
144. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1063 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (contending that the focus on things that affect the Fly's
habitat "improperly inverts the third prong of Lopez and extends it 'vithout limit").
145. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act as an exercise of the treaty power); Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources,
471 F. Supp. 985, 995 n.40 (D. Haw. 1979) (speculating that the property clause may support
the constitutionality of the ESA's takings provision).
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Judge Sentelle concedes is justified by the Commerce Clause.146
The BSA also authorizes the federal government to purchase the
habitat of endangered species to be managed for the preservation
of the species.147

The purchase of endangered species habitat

avoids the Commerce Clause controversies and the allegations that
the takings provision works a constitutional taking of private prop
erty requiring just compensation to the landowner. Also, most
states have acted to protect the endangered species in their midst,
and private organizations such as the Nature Conservancy spend
millions of dollars each year acquiring endangered species habitat
so that they can preserve it. The Fish & Wildlife Service has also
employed public education campaigns to persuade private individu
als to protect endangered species like the Fly.148 But as worthy as
these efforts have been, Congress remains unpersuaded that they
can replace the protective function served by the ESA's takings
provision.
So the Commerce Clause fights will continue. The questions are
different now, but the underlying debates about the meaning of our
federal system remain the same. What we do not yet know is
whether the understanding of federalism that produced

Lopez

and

other recent decisions will be the understanding that influences the
answers to those questions. For that we must wait because the
Court declined to meet the Fly.

146. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a), (d)-(f) (1994); see also National Assn. ofHome Builders, 130
F.3d at 1063 n.1 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (noting that "Congress may have the authority to
prevent interstate transportation of flies," and "prohibiting the local possession and exchange
of flies might arguably be necessary to preventing interstate transportation or exchange of
flies").
147. See 16 U.S.C. § 1534. See generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land,
83 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 82 (1997) (arguing that "federal ownership, not regulation of private
land uses, should be the centerpiece of our national biodiversity conservation strategy").
148. See FLY DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 2, at 35 (proposing a public outreach
effort to teach people about "the unique and vanishing ecosystem that the Delhi sands
flower-loving fly represents").

